ABSTRACT. In reverse mathematics, is is possible to have a curious situation where we know that an implication does not reverse, but appear to have no information on on how to weaken the assumption while preserving the conclusion. A main cause of this phenomenon is the proof of a Π 1 2 sentence from the theory Π 1 1 -CA 0 . Using methods based on the functional interpretation, we introduce a family of weakenings of Π 1 1 -CA 0 and use them to give new upper bounds for the Nash-Williams Theorem of wqo theory and Menger's Theorem for countable graphs.
INTRODUCTION
The strongest of the "big five" systems of Reverse Mathematics is the system Π where φ is an arithmetic formula (that is, a formula without set quantifiers). This axiom is impredicative: the set X is defined in terms of a quantifier over all sets, particularly including the set X itself and sets which may be defined in terms of X.
It is impossible for a Π theorems (in particular, the Nash-Williams Theorem * of bqo theory [8] and Menger's Theorem for countable graphs [12] ; rather than give the definitions necessary to state these theorems here, they are discussed in detail below).
In this paper, we attempt to resolve this situation in a systematic way: using ideas derived from the functional interpretation, we isolate the portion of Π 1 1 -CA 0 actually being used in these proofs, giving a family of weaker systems with Π 1 2 axioms, and then show that the proofs in Π 1 1 -CA 0 actually go through, essentially unchanged, in these weaker systems.
Rather than being based on the Π 1 1 comprehension axiom, we base our systems on the equivalent leftmost path principle:
Let T be an ill-founded tree of sequences. Then there is a leftmost path through T .
Our family of weaker systems use the Σ α -relative leftmost path principle:
Let T be an ill-founded tree of sequences. Then there is a path Λ through T such that no path through T which is Σ α in T ⊕ Λ is to the left of Λ.
Partially supported by NSF grant DMS-1001528. * Actually, the Nash-Williams Theorem is not Π 1 2 , but rather can be deduced in ATR 0 from a Π 1 2 sentence.
We define Σ α -LPP 0 to be RCA 0 extended by the Σ α -relative leftmost path principle, and TLPP 0 to be RCA 0 extended by Σ α -relative leftmost path principle for every wellordering α. Note that these formulations are still fundamentally impredicative: the branch Λ promised to exist is still to the left of paths which might be defined in terms of Λ itself.
Our main results can be summarized as: We emphasize that this paper does not give novel proofs of any of the mathematical theorems analyzed; our proof of Kruskal's Theorem is unchanged from Nash-Williams' proof [9] , our proof of the Nash-Williams Theorem is taken from Marcone's work [8] , and our proof of Menger's Theorem is the one given by Shafer [12] . Our goal is to illustrate that the methods here isolate the portion of Π 1 1 -CA 0 already being used in existing proofs, without requiring changes to the proofs themselves.
We briefly explain the motivation for the relative leftmost path principle. The leftmost path principle is a Π If we prove a Π 0 2 sentence τ using σ, we do not expect to need the full strength of σ in the proof. The functional interpretation (see [2, 7] ) can be used to extract a function F from the proof of σ → τ together with a proof of
Informally, a proof of σ → τ in a reasonable system cannot actually use the fact that the witness y(x) to σ is a genuine witness for all z; the proof only used the fact that y(x) is a witness for finitely many particular choices of z (where the particular choices may depend on the value of y(x)), and therefore it suffices to use an "approximate witness" y ′ which good enough for this particular proof.
The relative leftmost path principle follows a similar justification. A proof of a Π 1 2 sentence from the leftmost path principle cannot depend on having an actual leftmost path; instead, given a supposed leftmost path Λ, the proof must produce some (now countable instead of merely finite) list of paths (again, depending on Λ), and use the fact that none of these paths are actually to the left of Λ. An appropriate form of the relative leftmost path principle then gives us an "approximate witness" which is good enough for a particular proof. (This analogy between set and numeric quantifiers is a bit misleading if taken too seriously; the arguments given in this paper are actually derived from a functional interpretation for quantifiers over ordinals [3] .)
NOTATION
We briefly recall some notation which will be convenient to use throughout this paper.
We fix, throughout this paper, a computable bijective pairing function (·, ·) : N 2 → N. We routinely view subsets S of N as subsets of N 2 by equating S with the set of pairs x, y such that (x, y) ∈ S. Definition 2.1. If S ⊆ N 2 , we write field(S) for {x | ∃y(x, y) ∈ S or (y, x) ∈ S}. We often write xSy for (x, y) ∈ S. We write S x for {y | (x, y) ∈ S}.
By a partial order, we mean a set ≺⊆ N 2 such that:
(1) If x ≺ y and y ≺ z then x ≺ z, (2) x ≺ x for any x.
We say ≺ is a linear ordering if for every x, y ∈ field(≺), either x ≺ y, x = y, or y ≺ x.
When ≺ is a partial order, we write for the reflexive closure of ≺.
We always use < to denote the usual ordering on N. We often refer to orderings by a name for the field of the ordering, leaving the underlying order implicit. For instance, we will refer to a linear order α, and to the actual relation as ≺ α .
Definition 2.2. A sequence from S is a function from a (proper or improper) initial segment of N to S.
A finite sequence is a sequence whose domain is finite while an infinite sequence is a sequence whose domain is N. For any n, we write σ ↾ n for σ ↾ [0, n]. We write q 0 , . . . , q n for the sequence with dom( q 0 , . . . , q n ) = [0, n − 1] and q 0 , . . . , q n (i) = q i . When σ is a finite sequence, we write |σ| for | dom(σ)|.
If σ, τ are sequences, we write σ ⊑ τ to indicate that dom(σ) ⊆ dom(τ ) and for all i ∈ dom(σ), σ(i) = τ (i). If σ is a finite sequence, we write σ ⌢ τ for the concatenation of σ and τ , dom(σ
We generally use letters σ, τ for finite sequences and Λ for infinite sequences. We equate γ ∈ field(≺ α ) = α with {δ ∈ field(α) | δ ≺ α γ}.
Definition 2.4.
A tree of sequences is a set T of finite sequences such that if σ ∈ T and τ ⊑ σ then τ ∈ T . A path through T is an infinite sequence Λ such that for all n, Λ ↾ n ∈ T . We say T is well-founded if there does not exist a path through T .
Equivalently, T is well-founded iff the restriction of ⊐ to T is a well-founded partial order.
We make extensive use in this paper of the standard systems of Reverse Mathematics, particularly RCA 0 , ACA 0 , ATR 0 , and Π 1 1 -CA 0 . [14] is the standard reference. Definition 2.5. If Y is a set and ≺ is a partial order, for any j ∈ field(≺) we write
If θ(x, Y, z, Z) is a formula with the displayed free variables, we write H θ (α, Y, z, Z) for the formula which says that for every j ∈ α with j = 0, (
When θ is a universal Σ 1 formula, we just write H(α, Y, Z), omitting the other parameters.
Recall that the main axiom of ATR
Definition 2.6. If φ is a formula, T I(α, φ) is the formula stating that transfinite induction for φ holds along α:
PRINCIPLES AND CLAIMS
In this section we introduce the main principles we will work with through the rest of this paper. If T is an ill-founded tree of sequences and ≺ is well-founded then there exists a minimal path through T . LPP 0 is RCA 0 together with the restriction of the minimal path principle to the case where ≺ is the usual ordering < on the natural numbers. We call this the leftmost path principle.
We will later show that the minimal and leftmost path principles are equivalent (Theorem 4.4), and in a computable way, so in all the variants we introduce, there will be no difference between the minimal and leftmost versions.
The following is proved in [8] :
We introduce a family of restricted forms of MPP 0 and LPP 0 : Definition 3.3. For any n, Σ n -MPP 0 is RCA 0 together with the Σ n -relative minimal path principle:
Whenever T is an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and ≺ is a wellfounded partial order, there is a path Λ through T such that there is no path
Σ n -LPP 0 is RCA 0 together with the restriction of the Σ n -relative minimal path principle to the case where ≺ is <.
When we take ATR 0 to be our base theory, we may extend this definition to higher levels of the jump hierarchy. We will see later that even Σ 0 -LPP 0 implies ATR 0 . Whenever T is an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and ≺ is a wellfounded partial order, there is a path Λ through T and a S satisfying H(α, S, T ⊕ Λ) such that no index of S is a path through T to the left of Λ.
Finally, TMPP 0 is RCA 0 together with the transfinite minimal path principle Whenever α is a well-founded ordering, Σ α -MPP 0 holds. Σ α -LPP 0 and TLPP 0 are the restrictions of Σ α -MPP 0 and TMPP 0 respectively to the case where ≺ is <. 
whenever φ is a Σ n (Π [14] ). We would like to extend this hierarchy to ordinals without adding comprehension over Π 1 1 formulas. Since we only use this hierarcy to calibrate the strength of TMPP 0 , we take a simple but indirect approach. Definition 3.6. Let M be a model of second order arithmetic and let α be a well-ordering. We say M satisfies
Note that Σ α (Π 1 1 )-TI 0 is not a theory in the language of second order arithmetic, however it is convenient, within a ground model N of second order arithmetic, to discuss whether some countably coded ω-model M satisfies Σ α (Π ∀y¬φ(i, y, S), it must be that there is some i with Λ(i) > 0 but ∀y¬φ(i, y, S). But then the function
is also an infinite path through T and easily computable from Λ. But Λ ′ < Λ, contradicting the fact that Λ was relatively leftmost.
Proof. It suffices to show transfinite recursion over Σ 1 formulas. Suppose W O(α) and let θ(x) = ∃yφ(x, y, Y ); we will show that ∃Y H θ (α, Y ). Note that since φ is Σ 0 , for any i, Y such that ∃yφ(i, y, Y ) holds, there is an m such that for any
We will again consider a tree of potential characteristic functions for Y . A finite sequence of natural numbers is valid if:
• For any γ ∈ field(α) and any i such that σ((i, γ)) = 0, there is some Y such that
Note that, since φ is a computable formula, these conditions are arithmetic (indeed, computable), despite the apparent set quantifier. The idea is that when σ((i, γ)) = 0, the universal formula should be true, and when σ((i, γ)) > 0, the existential should be true. When σ((i, γ)) = 1, the existential quantifier is "unjustified": no witness is required. When σ((i, γ)) > 1, however, a witness is required, and σ((i, γ)) − 2 should be such a witness.
The final condition in the construction of the tree is perhaps the least obvious; the point is that when we set σ((i, γ)) = 0, we might be depending on the fact that σ((j, δ)) = 1 for some δ < α γ but j much larger than i so that (i, γ) < (j, δ). If we wanted to fix a potential characteristic function by setting σ((j, δ)) = 0, we would have to restore σ((i, γ)) = 1, and since (i, γ) appears below (j, δ), we are no longer moving to the left. Our solution is to require that once we set σ((i, γ)) = 1 in a path, we are supposed to be certain about (j, δ) whenever δ < α γ. This is enforced by requiring that we actually provide witnesses to existential formulas of all lower ranks.
There are no requirements when σ(x) = 1, so the function Λ 0 (x) = 1 for all x is an infinite path through this tree. By Σ 0 -LPP 0 , we may find a relatively leftmost path Λ.
, contradicting the requirement on sequences in our tree. If Λ((i, γ)) = 0, i ∈ (Y ) γ as desired. So suppose Λ((i, γ)) = 1.
Observe that for δ < α γ, we have (Y ) δ = {i | ∃yφ(i, y, (Y ) δ }. In particular, if Λ((j, δ)) = 1 and δ < α γ then there must be some y such that ∃yφ(i, y, (Y ) δ ), and we may therefore computably (in (Y ) δ ) find such a y; we name this value y(j, δ). We define δ) ) by definition, while if δ > α γ then, since Λ satisfied the third condition in the definition of the tree, we must have had Λ((j, δ)) = 1 = Λ ′ ((j, δ)). We check that Λ ′ is an infinite path through T ; let
′ is an infinite path computable from Λ and to the left of Λ, which contradicts the choice of Λ.
Finally, we give our main lower bound on Σ α -LPP 0 . The results below show that this bound is almost sharp, leaving a small gap between the amount of transfinite induction needed to obtain Σ α -LPP 0 and the amount implied by Σ α -LPP 0 .
Proof. We will view a sequence Λ as coding a model M by setting (i, n) ∈ M iff Λ((i, n)) > 0. Since M will be viewed as a countable coded ω-model, this is saying
In order to ensure closure under arithmetic comprehension, it will be convenient to have a name for the set M i . We consider an extension of the language of second order logic by countably many new set constants, S 1 , . . .. (For technical reasons, it will be convenient to assume that this language has existential quantifiers and negation, but no universal quantifier.) We view M as a model of this extended language by defining M n ∈ S i iff n ∈ M i .
We will define our tree so that when φ is an arithmetic formula in this language with a single free variable, the set M (0,⌈φ⌉) = {n | M φ(n)}. This will ensure that we have a model of ACA 0 . (When we define conditions below, we fix a variable and only discuss M 0,⌈φ⌉ where no other variables occur free in φ; there are no conditions on other cases.)
The new complication will be ensuring that the model satisfies
then there would be some arithmetic φ(X, x), some n, and a sequence Υ, Σ α in {j | ∀iφ(M i , j)}, such that Z is an infinite descending sequence in M n . (The key point, of course, will be that Z is Σ α+1 in M .) We will ensure that if M (2,n) is non-trivial then it is some descending sequence in M n . (We will also use M (1,n) to make the coding easier.)
We will handle the dependencies of one set on another in a similar manner to the previous theorem. For this purpose, we define
• lvl((0, ⌈φ⌉)) = 0 if φ is atomic and not of the form t ∈ S i ,
We say a sequence σ is valid if whenever σ(((i, j), k)) is defined:
• If i = 0 and j = ⌈φ⌉ where φ is atomic and not of the form t ∈ S i then σ(((i, j), k)) = 1 if φ is true and 0 if φ is false,
σ(((0, ⌈ψ⌉), k)) > 0, and 0 otherwise,
and 0 otherwise. It is easy to construct an infinite path through this tree (the sequence constantly 1 will no longer work, because of the conditions for atomic formulas, ∧, and ¬, but these cases are easily dealt with).
Let Λ be the path given by Σ α+1 -LPP 0 . We show that for all n,
If n = (2, m) and there is any infinite decreasing sequence in M m which is Σ α+1 in M then M n is such a sequence. Naturally, we proceed by induction on lvl(n). The first claim is identical to the argument in the previous theorem. The second claim is obtained by a similar argument: suppose there is an infinite decreasing sequence Υ in M m which is Σ α+1 in M . By construction, if M n is not such a sequence, we have σ(((1, m), 0)) = 0, so we obtain a new sequence
, and resetting everything of higher level. Note that any component which depends on the values at M (1,m) or M (2,m) (for instance, sets defined by formulas containing the constant S (2,m) ) has a higher index then m, and therefore all its indices are greater than ((1, m), 0).
we obtain a contradiction, so M n was already an infinite descending sequence in M m , concluding the induction.
This immediately gives that M is a model of
Before continuing, we note that there is no difference in strength between the leftmost and minimal path principle. (
Proof. The right to left directions are all trivial. We prove the left to right direction.
Let ≺ be a well-founded partial order. Since even Σ 0 -LPP 0 implies ACA 0 , we may assume that ≺ is actually a linear order. (More precisely, we define x ≺ ′ y to hold if either x ≺ y or x, y are incomparable and x < y, and then use Ramsey's Theorem for Pairs, provable in ACA 0 , to show that ≺ ′ is well-ordered.) We define a computable map π from field(≺) ⊆ N to N <ω such that if x ≺ y then π(x) < π(y). We first define an auxiliary map π ′ inductively. π ′ will have the property that its image consists only of sequences of even numbers followed by a single odd number. We define π ′ by the following algorithm: let y be given and suppose π ′ (x) has been defined for all x < y. If there is any x < y such that y ≺ x, choose x ≺-least such that this holds, so π ′ (x) = σ ⌢ n , and set π
If there is no such x, set π ′ (y) = m where m is again the smallest odd number so π ′ (y) = π ′ (z) for z < y.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the maximum of x and y with respect to <. Suppose y < x. We proceed by side induction on y along ≺, so assume that whenever z < x and x ≺ z ≺ y, π ′ (x) < π ′ (z). First, assume there is no such z, so y is ≺-least such that x ≺ y and y < x. Then for some σ, n, π
. Suppose x < y. Suppose there is some z < y such that y ≺ z, and let z be ≺-least such that this is the case. Then by IH,
Proof. Since ≺ is a linear order, if x ≺ y then either x = y, in which case π
Proof. Suppose not, and let σ 0 ⊐ σ 1 ⊐ · · · be an infinite descending sequence. Since odd numbers are always terminal, each σ i consists only of even numbers. Note that, by construction of
Therefore the x i form an infinite descending sequence through ≺, contradicting the fact that ≺ is well-founded. ⊣ Now we define π(x) = π ′ (x) ⌢ x . (The purpose of this suffix is to ensure that the inverse map is computable.) Given a sequence σ, define π(σ) inductively by π( ) = and π(σ ⌢ n ) = π(σ) ⌢ π(n). π is clearly injective. Now let T be an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and define
Proof. Note that, since {σ | ∃xσ ⊑ π(x)} is well-founded, all subsequences of Λ ′ consisting only of even numbers must be finite. Then we may uniquely decompose Λ ′ into a sequence of blocks
where σ i consists only of even numbers and n i is odd. Then for each i, we must have
Let Λ ′ be a path through T ′ given by LPP 0 and let Λ be the unique path through
contradicting the choice of Λ. The second and third parts of the claim follow since if
4.1. Models of Σ Proof. We first carry out the proof of Lemma VIII.4.18 of [14] , taking into account that we need to also include a path through T which will become our ≺-minimal path.
Theorem 4.6 (TLPP 0 ). If T is an ill-founded tree of sequences and ≺ is well-founded then there is a countable coded
Let O 1 (a, T ) be a Σ 1 1 formula stating that there is an infinite path Λ through T such that:
(
, a = (e, i), and since < T e ↾ i is a well-order, there is a Λ such that no path computable in a Y satisfying H(a, Y, T ⊕ Λ) is ≺ Λ. Since TLPP 0 implies ATR 0 , we have some Y such that H(a, Y, T ⊕ Λ), and we may take M to be the set of sets Turing reducible to Y .
Since
The proof of Lemma VIII.4.19 of [14] now shows that there is a model M ⊆ M * of Σ 1 1 -DC 0 containing T and Λ; it follows that M believes Λ is a ≺-minimal path through T .
HIGMAN'S AND KRUSKAL'S THEOREMS
Definition 5.1. Q is an well-quasi-order (wqo) if Q is a partial order and whenever Λ :
Q is a well-quasi-order iff the tree of bad sequences from Q is well-founded. 
Nash-Williams gave the following short proof of Higman's Theorem:
Proof. Suppose Q, is a wqo but Q <ω is not. Define σ ≤ τ if |σ| ≤ |τ |. Let Λ be an infinite sequence demonstrating Q <ω given by the leftmost path principle. Clearly Λ(i) = for any i, since then we would have
, and c(i, j) = 1 otherwise. By Ramsey's Theorem for Pairs, there is an infinite set S such that c is homogeneous on S.
If c were homogeneously 1, the function q ↾ S would give an infinite sequence in Q contradicting the fact that Q is a wqo. So c must be homogeneously 0. If for any
. This contradicts the construction of Λ.
Let {i 0 , i 1 , . . .} be the increasing enumeration of S. Define Λ
So Λ * is an infinite bad sequence and Λ * < Λ contradicting the fact that Λ is a leftmost path.
We may observe that Λ * in the proof is Σ 1 , and therefore that this proof goes through without change in Σ 1 -LPP 0 .
Schütte and Simpson [11, 13] gave a different proof of Higman's Theorem in ACA 0 . Specifically, their proof shows that if Q <ω is not a wqo then neither is ω ω Q+1 ; it follows that if there is an infinite bad sequence Λ from Q <ω then there is an infinite bad sequence Λ ′ from Q such that Λ ′ is Σ 2 in Λ. We now wish to discuss the proof of Kruskal's Theorem; inconveniently, the proof concerns trees in a slightly different sense than we have been using. To avoid confusion, we will call these K-trees.
Definition 5.4. A K-tree is a finite set T together with a partial order ≤ T such that:
• T has a unique root r ∈ T such that for all t ∈ T , r ≤ T t and if t = r then t ≤ T r, and
We write t ∧ T u for the infimum of t and u, so t ∧ T u ≤ T t, t ∧ T u ≤ T u, and if both
If Q is a quasi-ordering, a Q-labeled K-tree is a pair (T, f ) where T is a K-tree and f : T → Q. We define a quasi-ordering ≺ K on Q-labeled K-trees by setting Proof. Suppose Q is a wqo but the Q-labeled K-trees are not. Define ≺ * K to by setting
Then the tree of bad sequences of Q-labeled K-trees is ill-founded, so let Λ be a relatively ≺ Given a Q-labeled K-tree (T, f ), let F (T, f ) be the finite set of proper subtrees of (T, f ). If T is a tree, write r T for the root of T and σ T,f for the sequence of immediate successors of r (in an arbitrary order). We may equate (T, f ) with the pair (f (r T ),
* is an infinite path to the left of Λ, contradicting the choice of Λ. To see that the proof goes through in Σ 2 -LPP 0 , we need only observe that we applied Higman's Theorem to a path given by Ramsey's Theorem for Pairs, and since we may choose the path given by Ramsey's Theorem is low 2 in Λ (see [4] ), it follows that Λ * can be chosen Σ 2 in Λ.
A complete analysis of the proof-theoretic strength of Kruskal's Theorem was given by Rathjen and Weierman [10] ; Σ 2 -LPP 0 is close to (but not exactly) tight, at least with respect to proof-theoretic strength.
THE ARITHMETIC RELATIVE MINIMAL PATH PRINCIPLE
In this section we prove the following:
Throughout this section, fix a tree of sequences T and a well-ordering ≺. We write T σ for {τ ∈ T | σ ⊑ τ }.
All definitions in this section are assumed to be given in ACA 0 . We write F n for the collection of basic formulas of rank n and write rk(φ) for the least n such that φ is a formula of rank n.
When s is a set of L-formulas, we defineŝ
We take ⊢ to be the usual deduction relation for first-order logic. Definition 6.3. For each n, define T n (T ) to consist of those finite sets s of L-formulas such that:
• If φ ∈ s then φ is a closed basic formula of rank ≤ n,
If i is largest such that for some j, F (i) = j ∈ s, we write σ s for
, we write t ≺ +1 s if there is a formula ∀xφ ∈ s with rk(φ) = n such thatt ⊢ ∃x¬φ.
Note that the construction of T n (T ) requires arithmetic comprehension. (We could probably, at significant additional labor, reduce this to computable comprehension, since we are really only concerned with fairly direct proofs.)
Proof. We need only check that t ∪ s is consistent. Suppose not. Since t is consistent, t ⊢ ¬φ for some φ ∈ s of rank n + 1. It cannot be that φ is universal, since then we would have t ≺ +1 s, so φ must be existential. But if φ is existential then π n+1 n (s) ⊢ φ, and since t is consistent and extends π n+1 n (s), we cannot havet ⊢ ¬φ. Definition 6.5. For each n, we define collections W F ′ n ⊆ T β (T ) and W F n ⊆ T β (T ) inductively as follows.
• W F ′
(t) holds if:
Suppose that for every τ ≺ σ t , T τ is well-founded. Then T σt is wellfounded.
We have stated W F ′ 0 and W F 0 to emphasize the similarity with W F ′ n and W F n , however W F ′ 0 (t) actually immediately implies W F 0 (t): if W F ′ 0 (t) holds, s ⊇ t, and for every τ ≺ σ s , T τ is well-founded, then also for every τ ≺ σ t , T τ is well-founded, and therefore T σt is well-founded, which implies that T σs is well-founded. This means that W F 0 is (equivalent to) a Σ 0 (Π 1 1 ) formula, and so for each n, W F n is (equivalent to) a Σ n (Π Lemma 6.6 (ACA 0 ). If W F n (s) and s ⊆ t then W F n (t).
Proof. Immediate, since the definition is monotonic.
Proof. Assuming W F n (π n+1 n (t)), for every s ⊇ π n+1 n (t), W F n (s). This implies W F n+1 (t).
Lemma 6.8 (Σ
. Let φ be a basic rank 0 formula, let s ∈ T 0 (T ), and suppose that for every t ⊆ s such that t decides φ, W F 0 (t). Then W F 0 (s).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume φ is F (i) = 0. By main induction on r, we show that Whenever t ⊇ s with |σ t | = i + 1 − r, W F 0 (t). If r = 0, t decides F (i) = 0, and therefore by assumption, W F 0 (t).
Suppose the claim holds for r and let t ⊇ s be given with |σ t | = i+1−(r+1) = i−r. If there is a τ ≺ σ t such that T τ is ill-founded then we immediately have W F 0 (t). Otherwise, for each k, let t k = t ∪ {F (|σ t |) = k}. By side induction on k along ≺, we will show that T σt k is well-founded. Suppose that for all k ′ ≺ k with t k ′ ∈ T 0 (T ), σ t k ′ is well-founded. Since |σ t k | = |σ t | + 1 = i + 1 − r, we have W F 0 (t k ). If τ ≺ σ t k and τ ∈ T , we either have τ ≺ σ t , in which case we have assumed T τ is well-founded, or τ = σ
in which case we have that T τ is well-founed by side IH. Therefore T σt k is well-founded. Since T σt k = T σ ⌢ t k is well-founded whenever σ ⌢ t k ∈ T , it follows that σ t is well-founded, as desired.
Since |σ s | = i + 1 − r for some r, the statement holds in particular for s.
Lemma 6.9 (ACA 0 ). Let φ be a basic rank n + 1 formula, let s ∈ T n+1 (T ), and suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F n+1 (t). Then W F n+1 (s).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume φ is the formula ∃xψ. It suffices to show that whenever the assumption holds of s, W F ′ n+1 (s). If s decides φ we have W F n+1 (s) by assumption, so assume s does not decide φ. Assume s satisfies the premise of W F ′ n+1 (s): whenever t ⊇ π n+1 n (s) and t ≺ +1 s, W F n (t). First, consider any s + ⊇ s such that (s + \ s) ∩ F n+1 = {φ}, so s + decides φ. Suppose t ⊇ π n+1 n (s + ) and t ≺ +1 s + . Then there is a formula ∀xψ ′ ∈ s + and a k such thatt ⊢ ¬ψ ′ (k). We must have ∀xψ ′ ∈ s and therefore t ≺ +1 s, so W F n (t). Since W F n+1 (s + ) holds, it follows that whenever t ⊇ π n+1 n (s + ), W F n (t). Now let s − = s ∪ {∀x¬ψ} and suppose t ⊇ π n+1 n (s − ) and t ≺ +1 s − . As before, there is a formula ∀xψ ′ ∈ s − and a k such that t ⊢ ψ ′ (k). If ψ ′ = ¬ψ, again we have W F n (t) since t ≺ +1 s. Otherwise, set s + = t ∪ s ∪ {φ}; then π n+1 n (s + ) = t, and therefore W F n (t) by the preceding paragraph. So for any t ⊇ π n+1 n (s − ) with t ≺ +1 s − , W F n (t). Since s − decides φ, we have W F n+1 (s − ), and therefore for all t ⊇ π n+1 n (s − ), W F n (t). Since π n+1 n (s − ) = π n+1 n (s), it follows that whenever t ⊇ π n+1 n (s), W F n (t), and therefore W F ′ n+1 (s). Lemma 6.10 (ACA 0 ). Let φ be a basic rank m formula, let n ≥ m, and suppose that:
Whenever s ∈ T n (T ) and for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F n (t), then W F n (s).
Then:
Whenever s ∈ T n+1 (T ) and for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F n+1 (t), then W F n+1 (s).
Proof. Let s ∈ T n+1 (T ) be given, and suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F n+1 (t). Again, it suffices to show that W F ′ n+1 (s). Suppose that whenever t ⊇ π n+1 n (s) and t ≺ +1 s, W F n (t). Let t ⊇ π n+1 n (s) be arbitrary; we will show W F n (t). To do this, it suffices to show that whenever t ′ ⊇ t decides φ, W F n (t ′ ).
, and in particular W F n (t ′ ).
(∅) then we cannot have t ≺ +1 ∅, so the premise of W F ′ n+1 (∅) is trivially satisfied, and therefore whenever t ∈ T n (T ), t ⊇ π n+1 n (∅) = ∅, so W F n (t). In particular, W F n (∅). Definition 6.12. Given s ∈ T n (T ) and a formula φ(x, y) with only the displayed free variables, we define a sequence σ s,φ recursively: ∅ ⊆ σ s,φ , and if τ ⊑ σ s,φ and there is exactly one i such thatŝ ⊢ φ(|τ |, i) then τ ⌢ i ⊑ σ s,φ .
Definition 6.13. Let n be a successor. We define T n (T ) to consist of pairs (s, U ) such that: 
If t ∈ T n (T ) and (s, U ) ∈ T n (T ), we say t ≺ +1 (s, U ) if there is a φ such that U (φ) = 0 but t satisfies one of the excluding conditions for φ.
As above, we have Lemma 6.14 (ACA 0 ). If n is a successor,
Lemma 6.15 (ACA 0 ). Let n be a successor. Let φ be a formula and suppose that whenever (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U ) and (t, V ) decides U (φ), W F n (t, V ). Then W F n (s, U ).
Proof. It suffices to show that W F ′ n (s, U ). Suppose the premise of W F ′ n (s, U ) holds, so that whenever s ′ ⊇ s and
First, if s satisfies one of the excluding conditions for φ then (s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}) ∈ T n (T ), and therefore W F n (s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}). Sinceπ(s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}) =π(s, U ), we have W F n (s, U ).
Otherwise, let (t, V ) extend (s, U ) such that V (φ) = 1 and dom(V ) \ dom(U ) = {φ}, and let t ′ ⊇ t with t ′ ≺ +1 (t, V ). Then there is a ψ such that t ′ satisfies one of the excluding conditions for ψ but V (ψ) = 0. Therefore U (ψ) = 0 as well, so t ′ ≺ +1 (s, U ), and therefore W F n (t ′ ). Since W F n (t, V ) holds, it follows that for all t ′ ⊇π(t, V ), we have W F n (t ′ ). Now set V = U ∪ {(φ, 0)}, so (s, V ) decides φ, and let t ⊇ s with t ≺ +1 (s, V ). Then there is a ψ such that t satisfies one of the excluding conditions for ψ but V (ψ) = 0. If ψ = φ then t ≺ +1 (s, U ), and therefore W F n (t). If ψ = φ then (t, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}) also decides φ, and so we have shown in previous paragraph that again W F n (t). Since W F n (s, V ), it follows that whenever t ⊇ s, W F n (s), as desired. Lemma 6.16 (ACA 0 ). Let φ be a formula and suppose that whenever s ∈ T n and for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F n (t), then W F n (s). Then whenever (s, U ) ∈ T n (T ) is such that for every
Proof. Our proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.10. It will suffice to show W F ′ n (s, U ). Suppose the premise of W F ′ n (s, U ) holds, so whenever t ⊇ s and t ≺ +1 s, W F n (t). Let t ⊇ s be given. By assumption, it suffices to show that whenever t ′ ⊇ t and t
By a decision of rank n, we mean either a formula φ of rank n, or U (φ) where φ is a basic formula of rank ≤ n in the form ∃zφ(x, y, z) with only the displayed free variables. If for any (s, U ) ∈ S and any decision φ such that whenever (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U ), (t, V ) ∈ S, and (t, V ) decides φ, A(t, V ), then A(s, U ).
Then for every (s, U ) ∈ S, A(s, U ).
Proof. Fix a surjective function ρ from N to the set of decisions, and consider the tree S ′ of increasing sequences σ from S such that for each i, if ρ(i) is a decision of rank ≤ n then σ(i) decides ρ(i). Clearly any infinite path through S ′ is an infinite path through S deciding all formulas, so S ′ is well-founded.
We claim A ′ is progressive: let σ be given with (s, U ) its final element, and suppose that for all (t, V ) such that σ
, and therefore A(t, V ). Therefore A(s, U ), and so A ′ (σ). So by transfinite induction on S ′ , A ′ holds of all σ, and in particular, A(s, U ) for all (s, U ) ∈ S. Definition 6.18. 
• There is no infinite path through T n (T ) + deciding every decision. Then T is well-founded.
Proof. We first show that W F n (s, U ) holds for all (s, U ) ∈ T n (T ) \ T n (T ) + . Let (s, U ) be given with U (φ) = 0 for some φ. If T σ s,φ is ill-founded then σ s,φ ≺ σ s witnesses W F 0 (π n 0 (s)), and therefore W F n (s, U ). Otherwise, for each τ ∈ T σ s,φ , let
We proceed by induction on τ ∈ T σ s,φ showing that for every (t, V ) ∈ S τ , W F n (t, V ). Let (t, V ) ∈ S τ be given and suppose that for every k such that σ t,φ ⌢ k ∈ T and every
be any extension of (t, V ) deciding ∃kφ(|σ t |, k) (note that, pairing variables and using the fact that n is a successor, this has the same rank as φ). Then since V ′ (φ) = V (φ) = U (φ) = 0, it must be that there is such a k, and therefore t ′ ⊢ φ(|σ t |, k) for some k and σ t ′ ,φ ∈ T , so
Now we show that W F n (s, U ) holds for T n (T ) + using the modified induction given by the previous lemma. Suppose that (s, U ) ∈ T n (T ) + and ψ is a decision such that
by assumption, or (t, V ) ∈ T n (T ) + , in which case we have just shown that W F n (t, V ).
Therefore, by the previous lemma, for every (s, U ) ∈ T n (T )
It follows in particular that W F n (∅, ∅), and therefore W F 0 (∅). Since there are no σ ∈ T with σ ≺ ∅, it follows that T ∅ = T is well-founded. Lemma 6.21 (ACA 0 ). Let Λ be a path through T n (T ) deciding all formulas of rank ≤ n and let σ Λ be the corresponding sequence through T given by σ Λ (i) = j iff F (i) = j ∈ Λ(m) for some (and therefore cofinitely many) m.
Then whenever φ is a closed formula of rank ≤ n, the following are equivalent:
Proof. We proceed by induction on formulas. When φ is atomic, the equivalence follows immediately from the definitions. Suppose the claim holds for φ and ψ. The claim for ¬φ follows from the equivalence for φ and the fact that Λ decides all formulas of rank ≤ n, including ¬φ. Similarly for other propositional combinations of φ and ψ.
Suppose that for every k, the claim holds for φ(k). If ∃xφ ∈ Λ(m) then there is some k such that Λ(m) ⊢ φ(k), and by IH,φ(k)(σ Λ , T ), and therefore ∃xφ(σ Λ , T ). If ∀xφ ∈ Λ(m) then there are no m ′ , k such that Λ(m ′ ) ⊢ ¬φ(k), and therefore ¬φ(k)(σ Λ , T ) never holds, so ∀xφ(σ Λ , T ) holds. The other direction follows since either ∃xφ(σ Λ , T ) or ∀x¬φ(σ Λ , T ) must hold, and there is some m such that either ∃xφ ∈ Λ(m) or ∀x¬φ ∈ Λ(m).
Theorem 6.22. For any finite
Proof. Let T be a tree of finite sequences and let ≺ be a well-founded partial order. Suppose that for every path Λ through T , there is a Λ ′ which is Σ n in T ⊕ Λ with Λ ′ ≺ Λ.
Suppose there were an infinite path Λ through T n (T ) + deciding every decision of rank ≤ n. For each i, there is a unique σ Λ (i) such that F (i) = σ Λ (i) ∈π(Λ(j)) for some j (and therefore cofinitely many j). The function σ Λ must be a path through T . Suppose Λ ′ ≺ σ Λ and there is a Σ n formula φ such that ∃zφ(i, j, z, T, σ Λ ) iff Λ ′ (i) = j. By the previous lemma, we have ∃zφ(i, j, z) ∈ Λ(m) for some m iff Λ ′ (i) = j. Since Λ ′ is a path through T , none of the excluding conditions for φ can ever hold, so whenever Λ(j) = (s, U ) and U (φ) is defined, U (φ) = 0. But this would contradict the fact that Λ is a path through
So there is no infinite path Λ through T n (T ) + deciding every decision. Observe that the first two conditions in Theorem 6.19 all hold in Σ n (Π 1 1 )-TI 0 (since n is finite), so we obtain the conclusion that T is well-founded.
THE NASH-WILLIAMS THEOREM AND MENGER'S THEOREM

The Nash-Williams Theorem.
In what follows, we will use the letter b (and variants b ′ and so on) to represent finite sequences which are intended to be increasing (and specifically, members of a barrier).
Definition 7.1. A sequence b is increasing if whenever i < j, b(i) < b(j).
Let B be a set of finite increasing sequences. We write base(B) for the set of n such that for some b ∈ B and some i ∈ dom(b), b(i) = n.
A barrier is a set B of finite increasing sequences such that:
If b is a sequence, we write b − for the sequence given by b
′ ⊆ B (where B ′ is finite or infinite), and f :
If B is a barrier, Q is a B-better-quasi-order (B-bqo) if for every barrier B
′ ⊆ B and every f : B ′ → Q, f is good. Q is a better-quasi-order (bqo) if for every barrier B, Q is a B-bqo.
B is a barrier iff {b | ∀b ′ ∈ B b ′ ⊑ b} is well-founded as a tree of sequences from base(B).
Definition 7.2. Given Q,Q is the class of all pairs (α, f ) where α is a well-order and
NWT, the Nash-Williams Theorem, is the statement that for if Q is a bqo thenQ is bqo. ‡ GHT, the Generalized Higman's Theorem, is the statement that if Q is a B-bqo then Q <ω is a B-bqo. § Marcone [8] has shown:
Since GHT is a Π 1 2 sentence, it is not possible for GHT be equivalent to Π Proof. Clearly base(B ↾ X) ⊆ X. Suppose Λ is an infinite increasing sequence from X. Then since X ⊆ base(B), there is a b ∈ B such that b ⊏ Λ, and therefore b ∈ B ↾ X. Therefore base(B ↾ X) = X and every infinite sequence through X has an initial segment in B ↾ X. The other two conditions are immediate since B ↾ X ⊆ B.
Proof. Suppose b ∈ B ↾ base(B ′ ). Let Λ be an infinite increasing sequence from
, contradicting the fact that B is a barrier. Proof. Suppose B ′ ⊆ B is a barrier and f :
We must check that if σ ⊏ Λ then σ is a bad partial array; the first ‡ Note that even thoughQ is not a set, we can still formulate the statement thatQ is bqo in second order arithmetic.
§ Our statement of GHT differs slightly from Marcone's: Marcone takes GHT to be the statement that if Q is a B-bqo for all barriers B then Q <ω is a B-bqo for all barriers B, which is a Π 1 3 statement, and mentions this version of GHT as an intermediate step.
¶ Marcone's proof uses the "locally minimal bad array lemma", which is a principle similar, and equivalent, to the minimal path principle. This lemma is essentially an encapsulation of the particular application of the minimal path principle we use below. Another family of relative principles-the relatively locally minimal bad array lemma and so on-could be defined, but since they would be minor combinatorial variants on the principles we have given, we do not do so. Suppose Λ is an infinite path through the tree of bad partial arrays. Then f Λ is clearly bad, and we must check that dom(f Λ ) is a barrier. If b ∈ B ↾ base(dom(f Λ )) then there must be some n such that b ∈ base(dom(f Λ↾n )) and max b < base(dom(f Λ↾n )), which implies that b ∈ dom(f Λ↾n ).
We use the following uniformly effective version of the clopen Ramsey Theorem (the proof of the clopen Ramsey Theorem in ATR 0 is carried out in [6] , with another proof given in [1] ; the effective bounds for the complexity are given in [5] ). 
* is a barrier on base(B): if Λ is an infinite increasing sequence from base(B), we may find some b ∈ B such that b ⊏ Λ. We may also find some
Let α be such that given any coloring of a subbarrier of B * , there is an infinite homogeneous subbarrier Σ α in c. Now let B ′ ⊆ B be given and let c be a finite coloring of {b,
Theorem 7.11 (TLPP 0 ). GHT holds.
Proof. Let B be a barrier, and suppose Q is a B-bqo. We set
is not a B-bqo; then let Λ be a relatively minimal infinite sequence through the tree of bad partial arrays from B to Q <ω . Clearly f Λ (b) = for all b, so we may write f
and c(b, b ′ ) = 1 otherwise. By the previous lemma, there is an infinite S ⊆ dom(f Λ ) ⊆ B such that c is constant on B ↾ S is either bad or perfect, and since Q is a B-bqo, c must be constantly 0, so q ↾ (B ↾ S) is perfect.
For each n, write Λ(n) = (b n , q n ). Let n be least such that b n ∈ B ↾ S, and define
where j is least such that Λ ′ 0 (j) is defined and there is no i
. We now show that Λ ′ is an infinite path through the tree of bad sequences. Since dom(f
* is a barrier, we need only show that f
We consider three cases. If b ∈ B ↾ S and b
Observe that for any b ∈ B ↾ S, max(base(B * ) \ S) < max b. In particular, this means that it is not possible to have b ∈ B ↾ S but b ′ ∈ B * \ (B ↾ S). The remaining case is that
Therefore Λ ′ is an infinite sequence through the tree of bad partial arrays and Λ ′ ≺ Λ. It remains to check that the proof just given goes through in TLPP 0 . It suffices to show that for each B, there is an α such that Λ ′ is Σ α in Λ. Since Λ ′ is computable from the set S, this follows from the fact that the coloring c is computable from Λ and there is an α such that S is always Σ α in c.
Corollary 7.12. NWT holds in TLPP 0 .
7.2.
Menger's Theorem. In this subsection, we discuss a theorem about graphs. When G is a graph, we write V (G) for the set of vertices and E(G) for the set of edges.
Definition 7.13. If G is a graph and
, an A-B path is a finite sequences of vertices v 0 , . . . , v n such that v 0 ∈ A, v n ∈ B, and for each i < n,
Menger's Theorem for countable graphs is: The proof uses the following notions: It will be convenient to assume that our warps and waves do not contain elements of A except as the first element of a path.
Shafer [12] shows that Menger's Theorem for countable graphs is provable in Π It suffices to show that the first lemma can be proven in TLPP 0 ; by Theorems 4.4 and 4.6, we need only show the following: Lemma 7.18 (ACA 0 ). Let G, A, B be given. There is an ill-founded tree T , a wellordering ≺, and a computable bijection π between waves and paths through T such that whenever
Proof. Fix an enumeration V (G) = {g 0 , g 1 , . . .} and an enumeration {p 0 , p 1 , . . .} of all A-B paths in G. We define T to consist of sequences δ 0 , . . . , δ n such that:
• If i is even, either δ 2i = (0, 0) or δ 2i = (1, q i ) where q i is a path beginning with A and ending with g i , • If i is odd, δ 2i+1 = (i + 2, S i ) where S i is a non-empty subset of V (p i ),
• If q i intersects q j then either q i is an end-extension of q j or q j is an end-extension of q i ,
• There is some g i ∈ S j such that no path q k is a proper end-extension of q i .
Given an infinite path Λ, we define a warp
W is, by definition, a union of paths beginning in A, and the third condition ensures that distinct paths are disjoint. To see that W is a wave, observe that for any A-B path p i , some element in S i must be the final element of a path.
Conversely, given a wave W , we define a path π(W ) through this tree as follows:
where q i is the (unique) path in W beginning in A and ending with g i ,
Since W is a wave, π(W ) is a path through T .
We define ≺ by:
To see that this is well-founded, note in (i + 2, S), |S| ≤ |V (p i )| is finite. We must check that if
we may assume g i is the least such. Clearly π(W ′ )(2i) ≺ π(W )(2i), so we need only check that for j < i, π(W ′ )(j) π(W )(j). For j even, by construction and the fact that i was chosen least,
To see that T is ill-founded, observe that there is a wave W (specifically, V (W ) = A and E(W ) = ∅), and therefore π(W ) is an infinite path through T .
Shafer's proof now shows: 
THE RELATIVE LEFTMOST PATH PRINCIPLE
In this section we prove:
For the remainder of this section, fix α and assume W O(α). We write δ, γ for arbitrary elements of field(α) and λ for limits in field(α). We also fix a sequence of trees T and a well-founded ordering ≺.
All definitions in this section are assumed to be givin in ATR 0 . We will import as many definitions as possible from Section 6, since for successor level our definitions are unchanged.
Definition 8.2. We define L
α to be the language L from above, together with, for each limit λ ∈ field(α + 1), a new predicate V λ . For each γ ∈ field(α + 1), we define the rank γ formulas and the basic rank γ formulas inductively by:
• F (i) = j where i, j are terms is a basic rank 0 formula, • All other atomic formulas are rank 0 formulas, • If φ is a rank γ formula then ∃xφ and ∀xφ are basic rank γ + 1 formula, • For any limit λ ∈ field(α + 1) and any n, V λ (n) is a basic rank λ formula,
• The rank γ formulas contain the basic rank γ formulas and are closed under ∧, ∨, ¬, →. We write F γ for the collection of basic formulas of rank γ, F <γ for δ<γ F δ , and write rk(φ) for the least γ such that φ is a formula of rank γ.
Fix a Gödel coding ⌈·⌉ of L α . We define ⊢ on L α by adding two additional clauses to usual deduction relation for first-order logic:
• s ⊢ V λ (⌈φ⌉) iff rk(φ) < λ and s ⊢ φ.
• If rk(φ) ≥ λ then s ⊢ ¬V λ (⌈φ⌉). • If F (i) = k ∈ s and i ′ < i then there is a j ′ such that F (i ′ ) = j ′ ∈ s, • Let i be largest such that for some j, the formula F (i) = j ∈ s; then the sequence F (0), . . . , F (i) ∈ T , • If ∃xφ(x) ∈ s then there is some i such that s ∩ F rk(φ) ⊢ φ(i),
• If V λ (⌈φ⌉) ∈ s then rk(φ) < λ and s ∩ F <rk(φ) ⊢ φ.
If s ∈ F λ , we write rk(s) = max{rk(φ) | φ ∈ s ∩ F <λ }. We say s decides V λ (⌈φ⌉) if V λ (⌈φ⌉) ∈ s, V λ (⌈¬φ⌉) ∈ s, or rk(φ) ≥ λ. If δ ≤ γ, define π γ δ : T γ (T ) → T δ (T ) by π γ δ (s) = {φ ∈ s | rk(φ) ≤ δ}. If δ < λ, t ∈ T δ (T ), s ∈ T λ (T ), we write t ≺ +1 s if there is a formula V λ (⌈φ⌉) ∈ s such that t ⊢ ¬φ. Proof. We prove these by simultaneous induction on γ, δ. (Note that the statements of these two parts are of the form ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)) where φ, ψ are Σ γ (Π (s)), and therefore by Lemma 6.7, W F β+1 (s). If t ∈ T β+1 (T ) ∩ T δ (T ) = T δ (T ) and W F β+1 (t) then t contains no formula of rank β + 1, and so there are no s ⊇ π β+1 β (t) = t such that s ≺ +1 t, so we must have W F β (t), and therefore by IH, W F δ (t).
Suppose γ = λ is a limit ordinal. If W F δ (π λ δ (s)), we consider two cases. If rk(s) ≥ δ then we have W F rk(s) (π λ rk(s) (s)) by applying the first part of IH to δ, rk(s), and therefore W F λ (s). If rk(s) < δ then we have π λ δ (s) = π λ rk(s) (s), so by applying the second part of IH to rk(s), δ, we have W F rk(s) (s).
Suppose t ∈ T λ (T ) ∩ T δ (T ) and W F λ (t). Then since rk(t) ≤ δ, we may apply the first part of IH to rk(t), δ to obtain W F δ (t). . Let δ ≤ γ ≤ α, let φ be a basic rank δ formula, let s ∈ T γ (T ), and suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F γ (t). Then W F γ (s).
Proof. By main induction on δ and side induction on γ. (Note that for a given γ the statement is Σ γ+1 (Π .)The case where δ = γ = 0 is handled by Lemma 6.8. The case where δ = γ and γ is a successor is handled by Lemma 6.9. The case where δ < γ and γ is a successor is handled by Lemma 6.10.
So suppose γ is a limit ordinal. It suffices to show that if for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, W F γ (t), then W F ′ γ (s). If δ = γ then φ = V γ (⌈ψ ′ ⌉); in this case, we set ψ = ∃xψ ′ for some variable x not appearing in ψ; otherwise δ < γ and we set ψ = ψ ′ . Set β = max{rk(s), rk(ψ)} < γ.
Suppose t ⊇ π Then for any ρ, t ′ ⊢ ρ iff t ⊢ ρ, so t ′ is consistent. Also, t ′ ⊇ s and t ′ decides φ, so W F γ (t ′ ). Since rk(t ′ ) = β and π γ β (t ′ ) = t, we have W F β (t). Since W F β (t) holds for all t ⊇ π γ β (s) deciding ψ, it follows from IH that W F β (π γ β (s)) holds. Therefore W F γ (s) holds. The definition of T γ+1 given above for γ a successor is unchanged. In particular, we obtain: Proof. We apply Theorem 6.19. The first two assumptions are given by Lemmas 8.8 and 8.7 . Note that Lemma 6.17 is identical for Σ α+1 (Π Then whenever φ is a closed formula of rank ≤ α, the following are equivalent: (1) There is an m such that φ ∈ Λ(m), (2)φ(σ Λ , T ).
Proof.
We proceed by induction on formulas. The only new case is when φ = V (⌈ψ⌉); this is easily covered by the inductive hypothesis.
Then the proof of the following is unchanged: 
